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The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations in the
Protection of International
Human Rights
Barbara A. Frey*
The struggle to protect fundamental human rights has tra-
ditionally focused upon the relationship between the state and
the individual. Yet, the half-century consensus on appropriate
state action regarding fundamental human rights as defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' is not uniformly
respected. Given the complexity of the forces determining how
individuals are treated in different settings around the world, it
is time to examine the roles of other relevant actors, including
business, labor, the media, and the general public, in promoting
and protecting human rights.
This article attempts to shed some light on existing and pro-
posed human rights guidelines regarding one type of interna-
tional actor: the transnational corporation (TNC).2 First, the
article discusses some of the traditional methods of promoting
and protecting human rights, including standards adopted by
inter-governmental organizations and bilateral pressure for
human rights reform. This section also defines the minimum
human rights responsibilities of public and private actors, in-
cluding TNCs. Part two of the article reviews efforts to regulate
the activities of TNCs with regard to human rights. An exami-
* Executive Director, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, and Ad-
junct Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School and the Institute of
International Studies at the University of Minnesota. The author would like to
acknowledge the contributions of Sean Duffy, for his substantial assistance in
the original draft of this paper; and Tim Kenny and Jennifer Nestle, for their
legal research.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2. In the context of this article the term "transnational corporation"
(TNC) refers to a corporation with affiliated business establishments in more
than one country. See Jonathan Charney, Transnational Corporations and De-
veloping Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 749 n. 1 (1983) (citing
WERNER FELD, NONGOVERNMENTAL FORCES AND WORLD POLITICS 22-23 (1972)).
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nation of these codes of conduct will demonstrate that, although
existing corporate and governmental policies provide some gui-
dance for the appropriate role of TNCs in the field of human
rights, the policies are too vague to be either a predictor of corpo-
rate behavior or a guide for the proper corporate response to spe-
cific human rights violations. The article then analyzes the
emerging continuum of human rights responsibilities of TNCs,
based on the various regulations and voluntary codes that have
been adopted by governments, private groups, and by corpora-
tions themselves. Existing standards reflect that corporations
believe the further removed they are from human rights -abuse,
the lesser their degree of responsibility to act. Conversely, as a
corporation moves to the point of being the actual abuser, the
responsibility to intervene becomes the greatest. Thus, the con-
tinuum of human rights responsibilities of TNCs is constructed
according to the relationship between the TNC's activities in a
country, and the degree to which human rights are respected in
that country.
I. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION
Since the introduction of the term "human rights" into the
lexicon of international law, the primary actors in promoting
and protecting the rights of all individuals have been intergov-
ernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, as well as
individual governments. Corporations have traditionally played
a minor role in the protection of human rights. Increasingly,
however, private actors, including TNCs, are being scrutinized
for their human rights practices. Some corporations have re-
sponded by creating their own policies regarding human rights
violations in the countries where they operate.
A. ROLE OF THE U.N. IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
With the protection of human rights as one if its main pur-
poses,3 the United Nations has been the central forum for devel-
oping and enforcing human rights norms. 4 The U.N. General
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on
3. U.N. CHARTER preamble ("We the peoples of the United Nations deter-
mined... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of na-
tions large and small .. ").
4. FRANK C. NEWMAN & DAVW WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTs: LAW, POLCY AND PROCESS 5-16 (2d ed. 1996).
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Human Rights and various specialized agencies have all had a
hand in adopting and implementing human rights standards.
The U.N. has become even more proactive in protecting human
rights since the end of the Cold War, when the newly coopera-
tive Security Council began to establish field operations in vari-
ous trouble spots around the world.5
Despite these initiatives, the U.N.'s success in protecting
human rights has been limited, in part because by its nature it
is concerned with the actions of governments as the primary ac-
tors in the effort to protect human rights.6 In an era of fluctuat-
ing efficacy of governmental action, and a concomitant rise in
the effect of quasi-governmental and private actors on the eco-
nomic, social, cultural, civil and political rights of individuals,
the monitoring of state action alone does not address the rights
of all victims. Recent efforts by the U.N. to act against private
sphere violations, such as violence against women in their
homes, indicates a recognition of the importance of private ac-
tors in respecting and promoting human rights.7
B. ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
Along with intergovernmental organizations, individual
governments are key players in the effort to stem human rights
abuses. The most important governmental action taken in the
field of human rights is compliance with international obliga-
tions regarding treatment of individuals and groups living
within the state's boundaries. Governments can also use bilat-
eral relations to effect improvements in the human rights behav-
ior of other states. Some governments, most notably that of the
United States, have used human rights practices as a basic indi-
5. Id. at 9-16. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council of the
U.N. has established more than 26 peacekeeping operations. Id. On-site U.N.
activities with a human rights dimension have taken place in more than a
dozen countries, including Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia,
South Africa, Western Sahara, and the former Yugoslavia. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Dec-
laration, Annex I, at 5-8, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.177/20 (1995) [hereinafter Beijing
Declaration]. The Governments adopting the Declaration and Platform
"urge[d] the United Nations system, regional and international financial insti-
tutions, other relevant regional and international institutions and all women
and men, as well as non-governmental organizations, with full respect for their
autonomy, and all sectors of civil society, in cooperation with Governments, to
fully commit themselves and contribute to the implementation of the Platform
for Action." Id. 91 38 (emphasis added).
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cator of their willingness to maintain political, economic and cul-
tural relations with other nations.8 This type of bilateral
approach, like the U.N.'s use of intergovernmental pressure, has
met with varying degrees of success. The U.S., for example, has
used its influence to help secure the release of individuals from
prison, such as the celebrated case of Harry Wu,9 as well as to
pressure governments to improve their human rights practices,
such as withholding economic assistance,' 0 imposing barriers to
trade," or blocking loans and grants from international banking
institutions.12
C. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN
PROMOTING HuMAN RIGHTS
Historically, TNCs have not acted as moral agents in the
countries in which they do business. 13 In the past there had
8. See, e.g., Prohibition Against Foreign Assistance to Gross Violators of
Human Rights, 22 U.S.C. § 2151(n) (1990) (prohibiting economic aid to coun-
tries engaged in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally rec-
ognized rights"). Other legislation prohibits security assistance to gross
violators of human rights. Id. § 2304. Under this provision, the President has
the authority to determine whether the human rights situation in a proposed
recipient country has significantly improved, and may override these prohibi-
tions altogether if "extraordinary circumstances exist." Id. § 2304(a)(2).
9. See The Harry Wu Opening, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 25, 1995, at A26. Chi-
nese-American citizen Harry Wu was convicted in a court in Hubei province
and sentenced to 15 years in prison for spying; the U.S. government negotiated
his release and return to the U.S. in August 1995. Id.
10. Steven Greenhouse, U.S., Protesting Rights Abuses, Ends Military Aid
to Guatemala, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at A3.
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1994) (prohibiting the grant of most-favored
nation (MFN) status to countries with non-market economies that deny their
citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate).
When the United States granted MFN trading status to the People's Re-
public of China in 1993, it stipulated that China was to improve its human
rights record over the course of the following year as a condition of future re-
newal. Amy Kaslow, President Urges Renewal of China's Top Trade Status,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 28, 1993, at 1. In 1994 the Clinton Administra-
tion reversed itself and delinked the MFN decision from U.S. policy regarding
China's human rights practices. Ann Devroy, Clinton Reverses Course on
China; MFN Action Separates Human Rights, Trade, WASH. POST, May 27,
1994, at Al.
12. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 104, 110 Stat. 785, 794-95 [hereinafter Cuban Lib-
erty Act] (instructing the U.S. executive directors of international financial in-
stitutions to support loans or other assistance to Cuba only if it will contribute
to a stable foundation for a democratically-elected government there and re-
quiring withholding of U.S. payments from international financial institutions
that approve assistance to Cuba over U.S. opposition).
13. Cf Diane Orentlicher and Timothy Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors:
The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L.
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been no significant detrimental consequences when a TNC re-
frained from acting in response to a host government's violation
of the fundamental human rights of the corporation's workers,
or other widespread human rights abuses. 14 As TNCs become
publicly linked to grave human rights abuses, however, either
through direct involvement or tacit support of governmental vio-
lations, the theoretical separation between maximizing profits
and responsible corporate activity collapses. 15 Globalization of
the economy, characterized by corporations moving into rapidly
expanding markets in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America,
causes the relationship between TNCs and human rights abuses
to become more salient to world governments and to the public.
Recent consumer pressure on U.S. companies to ensure that
they do not market the products of forced, convict, or child la-
bor,1 6 and the decision of many companies to restrict their in-
& Bus. 66, 96-98. Business leaders who reject suggestions that they should be
human rights reformers usually defend their position by insisting that democ-
racy and human rights are promoted by free trade. See, e.g., Donna K.H. Wal-
ters, Firms Unshaken by U.S. Terms for China, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1993, at D3
(reporting business leaders' resistance to suggestions that they should be in-
volved in promoting human rights in China); Bruce Einhorn & William Glas-
gall, Doing Business with Strongmen, Bus. WK., Apr. 22, 1996, at 52 (describing
U.S.-based companies' lobbying effort to delink trade in China from all political
and human rights issues).
Both nation-states and private corporations have been discouraged from
interfering in the local politics of sovereign states. The prohibition on direct
interference in local politics has been one factor in discouraging TNCs from tak-
ing an active role in changing local governmental policies regarding human
rights. See generally Lori Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention
and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(1989) (reconsidering norms against political nonintervention in foreign
countries).
14. See George Black, Why the Debate? The Outcome Was Clear: Business
as Usual, LA. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at A14 (reporting that the business lobby
did not contest that there are human rights violations in China, but still suc-
ceeded in reversing President Clinton's China MFN policy).
15. See, e.g., Shell Game in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at A14 (as-
serting that Shell cannot responsibly continue to do business in Nigeria as if
unaware of human rights abuses); Marjorie Kelly, Though H.B. Fuller May
Wish It, Resistol Issue Won't Go Away, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TIRm., Dec. 4, 1995, at
D3 (questioning whether manufacturer should be liable to tens of thousands of
street children who sniff glue, even if they were not intended consumers of
product); Bob Herbert, The Sweatshop Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994, at A16
(asserting that industry leaders should bear responsibility for working condi-
tions in manufacturing facilities).
16. See, e.g., Human Rights: Ethical Shopping, THE ECONOMIST, June 3,
1995, at 35 (reporting introduction of new business terms by Levi Strauss after
discovery that conditions in Saipan factory were unacceptable); Marjorie Kelly,
Angry Kids Kick up a Big Fuss over Child Labor for Soccer Balls, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR-ThIB., Sept. 23, 1996, at D3 (reporting the introduction of a landmark code
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vestments in human rights "hot spots" such as Burma and
China1 7 demonstrate the increasing sensitivity of companies
and the public to significant human rights problems present in
many of the countries in which TNCs operate.
The United Nations and its individual member states face
increasing pressure to regulate the behavior of non-state actors
in regard to human rights.1 ' Some of the most significant non-
state actors in the world today are private corporations, particu-
larly TNCs. Since the 1970s, the United Nations and other inter-
governmental bodies have encouraged the creation of transna-
tional codes of conduct for TNCs. 19 In drafting these codes, the
primary goals were regulating TNCs to prevent interference
with the internal politics of host countries, and limiting the ad-
verse effects of TNC activities on national economic objectives. 20
In recent years, to promote foreign direct investment in develop-
ing countries, the U.N. has placed greater emphasis on
"strengthening the cooperation between host developing coun-
tries and transnational corporations."2' Critics contend that
this courting of TNCs by developing countries neglects the issue
of how foreign direct investment and competition affects the eth-
ical behavior of TNCs. 22
Activities of United States businesses in other countries are
regulated by the U.S. government to the extent that U.S. corpo-
rate investment in countries considered to be serious human
rights violators may be banned altogether. 23 In addition to en-
forcing government regulations, the Clinton Administration has
of ethical conduct by the Geneva-based Federation Internationale de Football
Association in response to a campaign by child labor activists).
17. See, e.g., William Beaver, Levi's is Leaving China, 38 Bus. HORIZONS 2,
Mar. 1, 1995 (reporting that Levi Strauss is ending its business dealings in
China due to what the company calls "pervasive human rights abuses"); Evelyn
Iritani, Giant Firms Boycott Burma Factories, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 27, 1994, at B7.
18. See Beijing Declaration, supra note 7, at 8.
19. P.T. MucHLINsIu, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5-11, 457
(1995).
20. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 593; see also infra notes 61-67 and ac-
companying text.
21. G.A. Res. 49/130, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 152, U.N.
Doc. A/49/130 (1994); MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 596 ("No longer is the con-
trol of the potentially negative impacts of TNCs the major issue; rather it is how
best to reintegrate developing countries into the global economy in a manner
that ensures inflows of new investment capital.").
22. Report of the Commission on International Investment and Transna-
tional Corporations, at 13, U.N. Doc. TD/B/42(1)/4, (1995) [hereinafter Transna-
tional Corporations Report] (statement of Consumers International).
23. See infra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
158 [Vol. 6:153
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publicly encouraged U.S. businesses abroad to regulate their
own actions regarding human rights and social responsibility by
adopting ethical codes of conduct.24
The proper relationship between human rights and TNCs is
a topic drawing increasing attention from citizens, governments
and corporations. No international code or standards have yet
been adopted specifying the responsibilities of TNCs to protect
and respect international human rights, but governments and
corporations themselves have begun to suggest the appropriate
framework of responsibility for addressing human rights abuses
in host countries. 25 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are
also taking steps to encourage TNCs to use their influence to
promote and protect human rights in countries in which they
are doing business. 26
An additional and very important factor is the push by con-
sumers, shareholders, and labor unions for corporate manage-
ment awareness of human rights abuses in the countries in
which they do business. Raising the visibility of human rights
issues with consumers may be an effective tool for changing the
behavior and policies of TNCs. 27 Shareholder dissatisfaction
and labor concerns have also led to policy changes.28
While internal or external policy statements may provide
general guidelines and goals for corporate behavior, specific reg-
ulations regarding corporate responsibility for human rights are
24. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS PRINCIPLEs (United States Dep't of Com-
merce 1996).
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See, e.g., A Working Paper: Corporate Measures on Behalf of Basic
Human Rights in China, (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), 1994; The
Minnesota Principles: Toward an Ethical Basis for Global Business, (Minnesota
Center for Corporate Responsibility, Minneapolis, Minn.), 1992 (promoting a
set of principles developed by a group of business leaders to foster fairness and
integrity in global business relationships).
27. See Stephen W. Pruitt & Monroe Friedmen, Determining the Effective-
ness of Consumer Boycotts: A Stock Price Analysis of Their Impact on Corporate
Targets, 9 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 375, 382 (1986) (finding that consumer boycotts
have a significant effect on corporate stock values).
28. See Jay Mathews, Pepsi to Sell Burma Plant, Citing Protests, WASH.
POST, Apr. 24, 1996, at F3. Consumer and shareholder actions regarding Pep-
sico's investments in Burma were significant factors in the company's an-
nouncement in May 1996 that it would sell its 40 percent stake in a bottling
franchise in that country, which is ruled by a military government responsible
for grave human rights abuses. Id.; see also New Sears Policy, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR-TRiB., Apr. 1, 1992, at D5 (reporting that Sears, Roebuck & Co. released a
new policy regarding purchases of products made by prison or forced labor after
its unions and shareholders voiced significant concerns over the lack of a spe-
cific policy).
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not likely to gain easy acceptance. Due to world economic and
ideological shifts, there has been a retreat from the interna-
tional control model that was in vogue in the 1960s and 1970s
regarding TNCs. States once critical of TNCs now find them-
selves competing for the benefits of foreign direct investment
from multinational companies. 29 TNCs have enormous influ-
ence both in their home countries and abroad because of the di-
rect and indirect benefits of their investments. 30 It is this
influence which stimulates human rights activists to engage cor-
porate decision-makers in the effort to promote human rights
and democracy in the countries where they operate.
D. DEFINING INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS
Before a TNC can be expected to promote and protect inter-
national human rights, those rights must be defined.31 While
the rights that accrue to individuals vis-a-vis governments are
generally defined, determining what specific rights should be
the concern of TNCs is not as straightforward an exercise. Of
guidance, however, are several international documents, ratified
by and binding upon the international community of states, con-
taining specific international human rights guarantees. The
most definitive interpretation of human rights obligations at the
international level is contained in the International Bill of
Human Rights.3 2 It is composed of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Universal Declaration or UDHR), 3 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESC
Covenant),34 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Civil and Political Covenant),35 and the Optional Proto-
29. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 9.
30. Id. at 10.
31. For a thorough analysis of relevant human rights and labor standards
for TNCs, see Orentlicher and Gelatt, supra note 13, at 108-16.
32. See Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126-27 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). The drafting and
subsequent adoption of an International Bill of Human Rights was one of the
first tasks appointed to the newly created U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
which first met in San Francisco in 1947. Id.
33. Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
34. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter ESC Covenant].
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [herein-
after Civil and Political Covenant].
[Vol. 6:153160
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col to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 6
Taken together, these documents set forth the basic definitions
of human rights and identify the responsibilities of nations and
individuals to respect those rights.
The Universal Declaration is accepted as the definitive in-
terpretation of the human rights to which all member states are
bound as parties to the United Nations Charter.3 7 Several of the
articles of the Universal Declaration are incorporated into cus-
tomary international law which is binding on all states. 38 The
UDHR contains thirty articles that cover civil and political
rights, as well as some fundamental economic rights.3 9 These
rights may be described broadly as rights to control one's own
36. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59-60, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
37. Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 287, 290
(1995) ("The Universal Declaration remains the primary source of global
human rights standards, and its recognition as a source of rights and law by
states throughout the world distinguishes it from conventional obligations.").
38. Id. at 289.
39. The articles of the UDHR pertain to the following rights:
ARTICLES 1-2: Human dignity, non-discrimination based on race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth, or other status;
ARTICLE 3: Right to life, liberty and security of person;
ARTICLE 4: Freedom from slavery;
ARTICLE 5: Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;
ARTICLES 6-8: Right to recognition before the law, equal protection, and to an
effective legal remedy for violations;
ARTICLE 9: Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile;
ARTICLES 10-11: Right to full and fair hearing of criminal charges, presump-
tion of innocence;
ARTICLE 12: Right to privacy;
ARTICLE 13: Freedom of movement;
ARTICLES 14-15: Right to seek asylum; right to a nationality;
ARTICLE 16: Marriage rights;
ARTICLE 17: Right to own property;
ARTICLE 18: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
ARTICLES 19-20: Freedom of expression and association;
ARTICLE 21: Right to participate in government;
ARTICLE 22: Right to social security and free development of personality;
ARTICLES 23-24: Right to work, equal pay for equal work, just and favorable
remuneration, to form and join trade unions, to reasonable limitation of work-
ing hours, and to periodic paid holidays;
ARTICLES 25-27: Right to an adequate standard of living, to free primary edu-
cation, and to participate in the cultural life of the community;
ARTICLE 28: Right to a social and international order in which rights and
freedoms can be realized.
Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
MN ,. J GLOBAL TRADE
body and actions, and rights to be free from discriminatory or
persecutorial state interference. Some particular rights include
the right to human dignity and non-discrimination on a variety
of bases: life, liberty and personal security; freedom from slav-
ery; the right to work and for equal pay for equal work; the right
to equal protection; marriage rights; and the right to own prop-
erty. TNCs often find themselves faced directly and indirectly
with issues involving the human rights defined in the UDHR.
The rights contained in the UDHR and the U.N. Covenants
are universal.40 Recent international conferences including the
U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in
1995, and the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, held in
Vienna in 1993, reaffirmed the principle of universality over
calls for some religious or cultural interpretation of those
norms.
41
All the rights contained in the Universal Declaration will be
relevant at one time or another to the TNC, if for the sole reason
that it exists in an ever-changing political and social context.
TNCs may be presumed to be faced with labor issues, such as
those involving equal pay, the ability to form and join labor un-
ions, and paid leisure time. TNCs must also concern themselves
with broader political issues, such as government-imposed polit-
ical indoctrination of employees in the workplace as a violation
of freedom of religion or political belief as guaranteed by article
18 of the Universal Declaration. Prohibitions against forced la-
40. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Con-
ference on Human Rights, 48th Sess., at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/24 (Part I)
(1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] ('The World Conference on Human
Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all States to fulfil their obligations
to promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, all human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and international
law. The universal nature of these rights is beyond question.").
41. See, e.g., id. at 23 ("While the significance of national and regional par-
ticularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be
borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms."). Even though, as a legal matter, the human rights defined in inter-
national law are universal, TNCs still face workplace issues regarding cultural
or religious interpretations of those rights. TNCs, for example, must resolve
the divergence between the international mandate of non-discrimination
against women and cultural or religious traditions which treat women as sec-
ond class citizens. TNCs must constantly walk a fine line between upholding
universal human rights standards and not imposing culturally insensitive prac-
tices in the workplace that reflect ethnocentric thinking. Codes of conduct clari-
fying the TNC's positions on these issues may facilitate a more open dialogue
between TNCs and their host countries.
[Vol. 6:153
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bor, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention, are also all
rights protected by the UDHR and are issues that many of to-
day's TNCs are facing. 42
E. TNC OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT AND PROTECT HUMAN
RIGHTS
Although the Universal Declaration provides a general
guide for a government's responsibility to its citizens, it is un-
clear whether TNCs are bound to respect these rights. The U.N.
human rights covenants are instruments of international law
that bind ratifying governments rather than non-state actors
such as TNCs.43 Corporations, however, do have a duty under
the International Bill of Human Rights to respect the rights of
others. Articles 29 and 30 of the Universal Declaration and cor-
responding articles 5(1) of both the ESC Covenant and the Civil
and Political Covenant prescribe the limitations on individual or
corporate actions in relation to the fundamental rights defined
in these instruments: no person or private entity may engage in
an activity which treads upon any other person's rights and free-
doms. 44 These covenants do not, however, expressly hold indi-
viduals or corporations responsible for affirmatively protecting,
i.e., taking steps to prevent others from violating, human rights.
That responsibility is assigned to governments who may, in
turn, regulate corporations as private actors. In terms of inter-
national legal liability, therefore, TNCs risk little if they are
complying with the domestic laws of the countries in which they
are doing business. as
Absent a legal duty, TNCs may have an ethical or moral
duty to respect the fundamental human rights contained in the
UDHR. Commentators argue that even absent international
42. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 4, 5, 9.
43. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 4, at 14.
44. The language in these three instruments is nearly identical. See Uni-
versal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 30 ("Nothing in this Declaration may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth herein."); ESC Covenant, supra note 34, at 50 ("Nothing
in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the de-
struction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limita-
tion to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant."); Civil
and Political Covenant, supra note 35, at 53.
45. This view of TNCs, however, is losing validity in contemporary discus-
sions of the role of TNCs in international law. See Charney, supra note 2, at
762-67.
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law directed at TNCs, there are particular moral and ethical du-
ties that TNCs must recognize. 46 One commentator has pro-
posed a detailed analytical framework for determining the
minimal fundamental international human rights that must be
respected and protected by TNCs. 47 His central premise is that
if governments, individuals and corporations can each "afford" to
respect and protect human rights, they have an ethical obliga-
tion to do So. 4 8
Convincing TNCs that they have an ethical duty to inter-
vene in human rights cases may be an uphill battle.4 9 A TNC is
unlikely to adopt proactive human rights policies without some
form of pressure.50 Currently, that pressure is building both in-
ternally and externally. Internally, it arises from company
stakeholders and from the troublesome situations in which com-
panies find themselves in international business. 5 1 The United
Nations, the United States Government, labor and community
groups have added to internal pressures by formulating laws
and corporate policies that either require or encourage TNCs not
only to respect human rights, but indeed to protect them
actively.5 2
II. REGULATION OF TNCs TO PROMOTE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Several international and national bodies, as well as private
corporations themselves, have enacted or attempted to enact
schemes for regulating the activities of TNCs in host coun-
tries.53 Until very recently, the majority of these regulatory ef-
46. Mark Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox
Guard the Henhouse?, 24 U. MLmI INTR-AM. L. REV. 399, 409 (1992-93).
47. See THoMAs DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 81-
85 (1989).
48. Id. at 82.
49. See, e.g., Paul L. Ferrari, U.S. Business and Human Rights Guidelines,
Soc. ISSUES SERVICE 1995 (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washing-
ton, D.C.), Mar. 3, 1995, at 4 (noting that business involvement in human rights
issues might interfere with goals of maintaining political neutrality, building
long-term business relationships, and avoiding cultural imperialism); Walters,
supra note 13 (describing U.S. companies' reluctance to push for human rights
in China).
50. Brian Tumulty, Businesses Participate in Chinese Human Rights, Gan-
nett News Service, May 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library (reporting
that Wal-Mart and Sears human rights policies have come at the prodding of
stockholder activists).
51. See Mathews, supra note 28.
52. See generally Orentlicher and Gelatt, supra note 13.
53. Baker, supra note 46, at 409.
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forts have been aimed at economic issues, including
environmental exploitation, anti-trust issues and truth in busi-
ness dealings.54 For instance, in the 1970s a main discussion
forum for codes of conduct for TNCs was international govern-
mental organizations interested in trade and investment.55
Among the organizations seeking to regulate TNC actions were
the International Labour Organization (ILO), 56 the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),57 the
Council of Europe, the European Economic Community, and the
Organization of American States (OAS). 58 The Chinese Govern-
ment's violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators at
Tiananmen Square in June 1989 brought corporate policies re-
garding human rights in foreign countries into sharp relief.59
Since that event- which juxtaposed the eagerness of TNCs to
take advantage of the emerging market in China with the horror
of the public at the government's repressive tactics- there has
been a significant trend towards defining the responsibilities of
TNCs for respecting and protecting international human
rights.60
A. UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
Many of the early U.N. actions to formulate policies for
TNCs focused on regulating restrictive business practices. 61
The newly independent states in the United Nations formed the
Group of 77 (G-77). With the support of the then-socialist East
Bloc states, the G-77 worked within the U.N. to control the abil-
ity of TNCs to threaten the sovereignty of host states through
54. SIDNEY DELL, THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 73-
74 (1990).
55. Baker, supra note 46, at 409.
56. See Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational En-
terprises and Social Policy, Nov. 16, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978). The ILO is a
tripartite organization with representatives of governments, business and labor
having access to its decision-making organs as members of national delega-
tions. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 458.
57. See 1976 OECD Declaration and Guidelines on International Invest-
ment for Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 967-79 (1976). The OECD re-
viewed these guidelines in 1979, 1982, 1984, 1986 and 1991. MUCHUNSIa,
supra note 19, at 607.
58. Baker, supra note 46, at 409 (citing Hans W. Baade, Codes of Conduct
for Multinational Enterprises, in 1 LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 407 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980)).
59. Orentlicher and Gelatt, supra note 13, at 70.
60. Id. at 70-79.
61. See DELL, supra note 54, at 24-26.
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the evasion of national regulation and taxation, the distortion of
market conditions, or the introduction of alien cultural values. 62
In 1974, through the efforts of the G-77, the U.N. General As-
sembly passed the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order63, which included inter alia the
recognition of the right of the state to control the activities of
TNCs acting within its borders and calling for a code of conduct
for TNCs that would prevent economic exploitation of host coun-
tries. 64 In that same year, the U.N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC) established the United Nations Commission on
TNCs (the Commission) comprised of members from forty-eight
states.65 The highest priority of this Commission was to formu-
late a code of conduct for TNCs.66 Capital-exporting states in-
tended to use the code as a means of protecting TNCs against
discriminatory treatment; capital-importing countries wanted to
use it as a means of subjecting the activities of TNCs to greater
regulation. 67
Work on the code began in 1977, and the Commission finally
transmitted a completed draft to ECOSOC in 1990.68 The com-
pleted United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corpo-
rations (the Code) was an attempt to strike a balance between
the competing interests of regulating corporate conduct and set-
ting forth fundamental standards for nondiscriminatory host
government behavior towards TNCs. 69 The final 1990 draft of
the Code explicitly stated that TNCs must respect human rights
and provided in relevant part the following paragraphs:
13. Transnational corporations should respect the social and cultural
objectives, values and traditions of the countries in which they
operate....
14. Transnational corporations shall respect human rights and fun-
damental freedoms in the countries in which they operate. In their
social and industrial relations, transnational corporations shall not
62. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 5-6.
63. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 527,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
64. Id. at 528.
65. See E.S.C. Res. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 1A, at 3, U.N.
Doc. 5570/Add. 1 (1975).
66. E.S.C. Res. 1908, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 13, U.N.
Doc. E/5570 (1974).
67. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 593.
68. Development and International Economic Co-Operation: Transnational
Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990).
69. DELL, supra note 54, at 73-74.
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discriminate on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, language, social,
national and ethnic origin or political or other opinion. 7
0
It was not until the late stages of the drafting process that
these two paragraphs were reconciled. Earlier drafts of the
Code included a "should" or "shall" option for each of these
paragraphs. 71 The final draft of the Code clearly required that
human rights take precedence over cultural norms.
Negotiations on the Code ground to a halt in 1992.72 TNCs
and Western governments opposed the adoption of the Code be-
cause, while it would impose significant duties on TNCs regard-
ing local ownership and control, safeguards on corruption,
taxation, and other business practices, the Code did not force
host governments to abide by equally stringent rules regarding
expropriation, intellectual property, and profit repatriation.73
In 1994, as part of the Secretary-General's decision to con-
solidate all activities related to transnational corporations
within the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the Commission on Transnational Corporations was
moved from its niche under ECOSOC to become a commission of
the Trade and Development Board. 74 The new emphasis of the
Commission's activities in UNCTAD is to facilitate flows of for-
eign direct investment, especially to developing countries.7 5 As
a result, the Commission's name was broadened to the "Commis-
sion on International Investment and Transnational Corpora-
tions," underscoring the shift that has taken place in the
relationship between TNCs and host countries. 76 With the end
of the Cold War and the acute shortfall of investment in develop-
ing countries, TNCs are no longer seen as suspicious intruders
by developing countries, but rather, as welcome and wealthy
guests. 77
70. Development and International Economic Co-Operation: Transnational
Corporations, supra note 68, at 7 (emphasis added).
71. See, for example, the 1983 version of the code, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc.
E/C.10/1983/S/2 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 177 192-206 (1983).
72. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 594.
73. Baker, supra note 46, at 411.
74. G.A. Res. 49/130, supra note 21, at 152.
75. Transnational Corporations Report, supra note 22, at 4 (statement of
the Officer-in-Charge of UNCTAD) ("Within today's globalized world economy,
characterized by increased interplay between investment, trade, technology
and services, member States placed increased emphasis on the contribution
that transnational corporations could make to growth and development. There
had been a marked shift towards greater openness of national economies to in-
ward foreign investment and the activities of transnational corporations.").
76. G.A. Res 49/130, supra note 21, at 152.
77. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 19, at 596.
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B. UNITED STATES POLICIES AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
In addition to the U.N., individual states have taken steps
to guide the conduct of TNCs. The United States Government
has long regulated the activities of TNCs. In 1930, for instance,
Congress passed the Hawley Tariff Act, prohibiting the importa-
tion into the United States of products made by convict labor.78
Direct regulation of TNCs began in earnest in the 1970s. Ini-
tially, U.S. policies regarding international commerce were con-
cerned with purely economic issues rather than human rights.
For example, in 1975 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave a
speech at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General As-
sembly that included a detailed proposal for a U.S.-endorsed
U.N. Code of Conduct for TNCs.79 His proposal focused on pro-
tecting the economic rights of TNCs and preventing TNCs from
interfering in the local politics or domestic affairs of their host
countries.8 0 Kissinger did not, however, include any mention of
protecting human rights.81
Even if human rights have not been central to its actions,
Congress has not been shy to use its power to prohibit U.S. com-
panies from trading or investing in disfavored countries. Eco-
nomic sanctions are a tool used to punish offending
governments; these sanctions have a direct impact on TNCs do-
ing or seeking to do business in these countries.8 2 The U.S. Gov-
ernment has sought to extend its influence even further in the
cases of Cuba, Iran, and Libya, by adopting legislation that
would penalize non-U.S. businesses that have certain types of
investments in these rogue states.8 3 These attempts are not re-
78. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
79. Henry Kissinger, Global Consensus and Economic Development, Ad-
dress Read by Daniel P. Moynihan Before the Seventh Special Session of the
U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 1, 1975), in DEP'T ST. BULL, Sept. 1975, at 432-
33.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1995),
regulating economic sanctions against North Korea in the areas of sales,
purchases, specifically designated nationals, sending gifts, travelling to North
Korea, and accounts and assets.
83. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110
Stat. 1541 (requiring the President to commence diplomatic efforts with U.S.
allies to establish multilateral trade sanctions); Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act, supra note 12, § 102 (urging the President to apply sanctions
against countries assisting Cuba).
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ceived well by neighboring countries.8 4 U.S.-based TNCs are
also subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 that
bars American companies from bribing officials of foreign
governments.85
Despite its willingness to regulate business activities in for-
eign countries, the U.S. government has made relatively few
successful legislative and executive efforts to specifically regu-
late TNCs on human rights issues. The most comprehensive
legislative response to human rights was the Anti-Apartheid Act
in 1986, prohibiting U.S. companies from doing business directly
in South Africa because of the South African government's
apartheid policies. 86
Legislation introduced in 1995 by Senator Mitch McConnell
proposes to ban U.S. investment in, and trade with, Burma.8 7
The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, modeled after the
Anti-Apartheid Act, seeks to prohibit investments that support
- knowingly or unknowingly - the abusive Burmese military
government known as SLORC (State Law and Order Restora-
tion Council).88 The bill mandates that the U.S. Government
withhold support for loans to Burma from international finan-
cial institutions, prevent direct assistance to SLORC and ex-
clude the members of SLORC from the United States.8 9
Carrying the flag of free trade, the Clinton Administration is not
supportive of efforts to prohibit investment in foreign countries.
The Administration opposes the McConnell bill, and it is not
likely to become law. 90 In an April 5, 1995 letter to AFL-CIO
President Lane Kirkland, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Chris-
84. D'Jamila Salem-Fitzgerald, Furor over Helms-Burton, L.A. TIMES, July
13, 1996, at A8 (reporting negative reactions of Canada, Mexico, and the Euro-
pean Union to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act).
85. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994).
86. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086
(1986) (repealed 1993). The Act contained a code of conduct that required pro-
tection of human rights. § 208, 100 Stat. 1097-98. The code of conduct was
required to be followed by any United States national employing more than
twenty-five people in South Africa. § 207, 100 Stat. 1097.
87. S. 1511, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
88. See 141 CONG. REC. S211 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) ("This bill makes clear our intention that such a regime will no
longer enjoy investments from the United States. Investments which so often
supported-knowingly or unknowingly-its totalitarian and abusive rule. The
bill also codifies our intention to withhold our support for loans to Burma from
international financial institutions, to prevent direct assistance to the SLORC,
and to exclude the members of SLORC from the United States.").
89. Id.
90. Reese Erlich, Burma Regime Still Shackled by Rights Issue Despite Re-
lease of Dissident, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 2, 1995, at A8, A10.
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topher acknowledged concern for the human rights situation in
Burma, but refused to support the full trade and investment em-
bargo proposed by Kirkland and captured in the McConnell
bill. 91 According to the Secretary of State, "To be effective such
an embargo would need international backing... We have found
no interest in an U.N. embargo. Indeed, many of Burma's larg-
est trading and investment partners argue for more trade and
investment and profess to believe that more interaction with the
world economy and with states where political diversity is
respected will encourage change for the better in Burma."92
Another method of regulating TNC actions abroad is to leg-
islate or suggest codes of corporate conduct. A bill introduced in
the U.S. Senate in 1989 sought to formulate a code of conduct for
U.S. corporations doing business in the Soviet Union.93 The pro-
posed legislation called upon U.S.-based TNCs to promote
human rights and democratic reform in the Soviet Union and to
ensure that the rights of Soviet workers were protected.94 The
proposed code of conduct was based on the "Slepak Principles,"
developed by Vladimir Slepak, a Soviet emigre and one of the
founders of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, an organi-
zation for monitoring Soviet compliance with international
human rights standards. 95
In 1991 Congressman John Miller introduced similar legis-
lation, designed to create a voluntary code of conduct for U.S.
companies doing business in China.96 The Miller bill provided
one of the first major U.S. Congressional initiatives to encourage
U.S. corporations to adopt and comply with a code of conduct
regarding human rights abuses.97 Although the Miller bill
passed in the House of Representatives as part of the 1991 Om-
91. Letter from Warren Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lane Kirk-
land, President, AFL-CIO (Apr. 5, 1995) reprinted in Christopher Clarifies U.S.
View on Burma Investment, Soc. IssuEs REP. (Investor Responsibility Research
Center, Washington, D.C.), May 1995, at 13 [hereinafter Christopher Letter].
92. Id.
93. Slepak Principles Act, S. 1018, 101st Cong. (1989). The Bill was intro-
duced in the Senate by John Heinz (R-Penn.) and Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.).
Id. The bill established seven principles for U.S. companies operating in the
Soviet Union including the refusal to use materials made by forced labor, and
the safeguard of Soviet employees victimized by political, religious, or ethnic
discrimination. Id. § 3(1)-(2).
94. David B. Ottoway, Code of Business Conduct in Soviet Dealings Sought,
WASH. Posr, May 17, 1989, at A18.
95. Id.
96. H.R. 3489, 102d Cong. (1991).
97. See H.R. 3489, 102d Cong. § 401(b) (1991).
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nibus Export Amendment Act, it was not enacted into law.98
Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Jolene Unsoeld
considered sponsoring a new bill patterned on the Miller legisla-
tion in the 103rd Congressional session, but backed away when
President Clinton, as part of his decision to remove human
rights from the MFN equation on China, vowed to propose his
own code of conduct for companies doing business in China. 99
Another recent legislative initiative potentially affecting the
practices of TNCs abroad and at home is the Child Labor Deter-
rence Act, introduced by Senator Tom Harkin. 00 The bill pro-
hibits the importation of goods produced abroad with labor of
children under the age of fifteen. If enacted, the prohibition
would affect the sourcing practices of virtually all U.S. retail-
ers.' 01 Due to the heightened public awareness of the problem
of child labor, many U.S. businesses now require that their part-
ners and vendors employ only persons who have reached the age
of fifteen. 10 2 The Harkin legislation would mandate this kind of
scrutiny for all sources of U.S. imports.
C. ExEcuTIvE INITIATIVES: MODEL BusINEss PRINCIPLES
The U.S. President, imbued with the power to conduct U.S.
foreign policy, has significant authority to control the actions of
U.S.-based TNCs in foreign nations. The President and the Ex-
ecutive agencies have the ability to enforce U.S. policy through
economic sanctions such as the revocation of most favored na-
tion status, the suspension of economic and security assistance,
and the vetoing of assistance from international financial insti-
tutions. 10 3 President Clinton, like his predecessors, has been
loathe to use this authority in a way that limits the interna-
98. See Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 13, at 82. The bill was passed out
of a joint House-Senate conference but failed to come to a vote in the House for
reasons unrelated to the code of conduct itself. Id.
99. Telephone Interview with Gare Smith, Former Legislative Aide to Sen-
ator Kennedy (Sept. 16, 1995). While the President did propose a voluntary set
of principles, the Clinton Code did not focus solely on China. See infra notes
104-15 and accompanying text (discussing the President's efforts to renew trade
with China and various responses to his policy).
100. Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995, S. 706, 104th Cong. (1995). The
Bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.). H.R. 2065,
104th Cong. (1995). The bill was read twice on April 6, 1995, and referred to the
Committee on Finance. Id.
101. H.R. 2065, 104th Cong. (1995).
102. See Memorandum from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Regarding Standards for
Vendor Partners (undated) [hereinafter Wal-Mart Standards] (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
103. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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tional commercial activities of U.S. companies.104 The foremost
example of this reticence is President Clinton's human rights
policy toward China.10 5 While he vowed during his 1992 cam-
paign to be tough on China's human rights violations, as Presi-
dent, Clinton actually has gone further than his immediate
predecessors, Presidents Bush and Reagan, to loosen economic
sanctions against China by delinking U.S. trade policy from our
national concerns about China's serious human rights viola-
tions. 10 6 In place of the annual MFN decision, Clinton vowed to
design a set of principles for companies doing business in China
as part of a "new and vigorous" effort to promote human rights
there.'0 7
In May 1995, President Clinton unveiled a set of Model
Business Principles, a voluntary code of business ethics to be
used by U.S.-based TNCs to show their commitment to uphold-
ing fundamental human and labor rights. 08 The Clinton Code,
written as a general code and not specific to China as suggested
in the May 1994 MFN announcement, represents the first signif-
icant effort by the Executive to create a minimum standard of
conduct for corporations with regard to human rights.
The Clinton Code has been criticized from all sides. The
human rights community argues that the principles embodied in
104. See Christopher Letter, supra note 91.
105. See Devroy, supra note 11, at Al (describing successful lobbying effort
by American business interests seeking continued trade privileges for China).
106. Id. "Clinton in his [1992] presidential campaign had sharply attacked
Bush for extending trade privileges to China in the years following the 1989
crackdown on pro-democracy activists in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, accusing
him of 'coddling criminals. Id. at A28.
107. Robert S. Greenberger, Code for Firms Selling Abroad Arrives Soon,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1995, at A2.
108. The principles are as follows:
1) Provision of a safe and healthy workplace.
2) Fair employment practices, including avoidance of child and forced labor and
avoidance of discrimination based on race, gender, national origin, and re-
spect for the right of association and the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
3) Responsible environmental protection and environmental practices.
4) Compliance with U.S. and local laws promoting good business practices, in-
cluding laws prohibiting illicit payments and ensuring fair competition.
5) Maintenance, through leadership at all levels, of a corporate culture that
respects free expression consistent with legitimate business concerns, and
does not condone political coercion in the workplace; that encourages good
corporate citizenship and makes a positive contribution to the communities
in which the company operates and where ethical conduct is recognized, val-
ued and exemplified by all employees.
MODEL BusiNEss PRINCIPLES, supra note 24.
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the Clinton Code are vague, 10 9 duplicative of existing laws,110
provide no method of implementation or enforcement, and
clearly are not intended as legislation."' U.S. business leaders,
in turn, criticized the Clinton Code as attempting to make TNCs
agents of the U.S. Government and placing them at a compara-
tive disadvantage with their competitors. 112 Still, several com-
panies were willing to sign on to the Clinton Administration's
initiative as "a useful reference point for framing the codes of
conduct of individual businesses."1 3 The Administration pro-
posed the Clinton Code despite taking the position that U.S.
business already plays a positive role in upholding and promot-
ing universal human rights standards. 114 The Department of
Commerce also announced several additional initiatives to fur-
ther this positive role including an annual award ceremony for
those businesses that have demonstrated a commitment to pres-
ervation and promotion of human rights. 15
109. The provisions regarding environmental protection and the mainte-
nance of a "corporate culture" that respects democracy and free expression are
so vague as to be nearly meaningless, especially given the voluntary nature of
the code as a whole. Comments on White House Business Principles, Press Re-
lease, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.),
Mar. 27, 1995, at 1.
110. For example, the provisions regarding a safe and healthy work environ-
ment and labor standards are redundant of existing international labor stan-
dards. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Convention, Convention No.
155, 2 International Labour Conventions and Recommendations, at 1230-31
(1981) (regulating safety, health, and the working environment); Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, July 9, 1948,
68 U.N.T.S. 17 (1948) (protecting workers' right to organize). Similarly, U.S.
companies are already obligated to "[c]ompl[y] with U.S. and local laws promot-
ing good business practices." MODEL BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 24.
111. See, e.g., Comments on White House Business Principles, supra note 109
(commenting that the Model Business Principles are 'far less specific, and
therefore may be less effective, than bills considered or pending in Congress to
legislate a code of conduct for businesses operating in China").
112. Evelyn Iritani, White House Unveils its Overseas Code of Corporate
Conduct, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at D1.
113. U.S. Outlines Business Ethics Code, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRi., May 27,
1995, at C3. The companies listed in support of the principles were Boeing,
Honeywell, General Electric, Westinghouse Electric, Eastman Kodak, Rockwell
International and Loral. Id. According to Gare Smith, Deputy Secretary of De-
mocracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, the Clinton Ad-
ministration is not seeking out companies to sign onto the principles, which are
intended as voluntary guidelines for businesses to incorporate into their own
codes of conduct. Telephone Interview with Gare Smith, supra note 99. The
Department of Commerce, however, is setting up a clearinghouse of codes of
conduct adopted by U.S. companies. Id.
114. MODEL BuSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 24.
115. Clinton Administration Encourages Voluntary Business Code, INT'L LA-
BOR OFFICE WASH. FoCus, Summer 1995, at 8, 9. The first awards by the De-
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D. PRIVATE INITIATIVES TO REGULATE TNC CONDUCT
REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS
Not satisfied with the pace of government reforms regarding
human rights, several private groups have proposed standards
for corporate behavior in countries with a pattern of human
rights violations. Two of the most noteworthy efforts to channel
the conduct of TNCs into ethical and socially responsible pat-
terns were the Sullivan Principles on doing business in South
Africa and the MacBride Principles regarding Northern Ire-
land. 116 These privately created and controlled efforts to moni-
tor corporate involvement in countries with serious human
rights problems have had a significant impact on the conscious-
ness and conduct of TNCs in those countries. Additionally, the
Sullivan and MacBride Principles advanced to corporations the
recognition that they play a significant role in promoting human
rights.
1. The Sullivan Principles
The code of conduct known as the Sullivan Principles was
the brainchild of Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, a black Baptist minister
from Philadelphia who served on the Board of Directors of Gen-
eral Motors.117 Sullivan's code of conduct included six principles
which placed businesses in the position of direct advocates of
non-discrimination in the workplace and the community during
the period of apartheid in South Africa. 118 During its height of
partment of Commerce were scheduled to be presented in fall 1996. Telephone
Interview with Gare Smith, supra note 99.
116. See Stratford P. Sherman, Scoring Corporate Conduct in South Africa,
FORTUNE, July 9, 1984, at 168; Dermot O'Callaghan, From Belfast to Brixton:
Could New Monitoring Measures Cross the Irish Sea?, PERSONNEL MGMT., Aug.
1988, at 44, 45.
117. Sherman, supra note 116, at 168.
118. The Sullivan Principles are as follows:
1) Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, locker room, and work
facilities.
2) Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3) Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same
period of time.
4) Initiation and development of training programs that will prepare blacks,
coloreds, and Asians in substantial numbers for supervisory, administrative,
clerical, and technical jobs.
5) Increasing the number of blacks, coloreds, and Asians in management and
supervisory positions.
6) Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in
such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health
facilities.
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effectiveness, the Sullivan code had more than 125 companies as
signatories, including giants such as Exxon, Mobil, IBM, Cit-
icorp and Merck. 119 The Sullivan Principles required not only
non-discrimination in the workplace, but community invest-
ments to increase opportunities for oppressed racial groups. 120
These Principles were implemented aggressively by the sig-
natory companies because they were actually graded for their
efforts to comply. 12 1 The "scorekeeper" was D. Reid Weedon, a
senior vice president of Arthur D. Little, a Cambridge Massa-
chusetts consulting firm. 122 Weedon graded the companies on a
curve; he increased the incentive for companies to shake the pil-
lars of apartheid by failing a third or more of the TNC signato-
ries in any given year. 123 This method resulted in the
desegregation of hundreds of enterprises, education and job
training for approximately 50,000 workers a year, and signifi-
cant investment in the infrastructure of black and desegregated
education in South Africa.' 2 4 Ultimately, however, these efforts
were not enough to do away with the fundamental human rights
violations of apartheid, and Sullivan himself supported an all-
out prohibition on investment through the Anti-Apartheid
Act.125
2. The MacBride Principles
Inspired by the success of the Sullivan Principles, a U.S.-
based group of advocates drafted its own code of conduct to en-
courage TNCs to combat the legacy of discrimination and strife
in Northern Ireland.126 Named after the late Sean MacBride,
Irish nationalist and a founder of Amnesty International, the
MacBride Principles offer detailed non-discrimination standards
to fit the context of the Northern Ireland situation. 27 In addi-
tion to promoting hiring, training, and advancement on a non-
sectarian basis, the principles call for a ban on "provocative, sec-
tarian, or political emblems from the workplace," and adequate
Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 171.
125. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
126. Robert L. Stivers, Northern Ireland and the MacBride Principles, 105
CmusTIAN CENTuRY 166, 167 (1988).
127. Id.
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security to protect employees from sectarian violence.1 28 The
MacBride Principles are not followed by the corporate commu-
nity, largely because of the lack of public pressure like that asso-
ciated with apartheid in South Africa.12 9 Political problems
prevent adoption of the MacBride Principles as well. Examples
of such political problems include the nationalist connections of
Sean MacBride, the fact that the government itself is making
efforts at non-discrimination, and the concerns of many in
Northern Ireland that the campaign would have a chilling effect
on investment, thus further disabling an already poor economy
and increasing sectarian tensions. 30 Shareholder resolutions
are the main vehicle for these principles' implementation, and
all shareholder resolutions failed. 131 Nevertheless, five states
- Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and
Rhode Island - adopted the MacBride Principles to guide their
investment policies regarding TNCs in Northern Ireland, caus-
ing many companies to take notice.13 2
128. The MacBride Principles call for:
1) Increasing the representation of individuals from under-represented reli-
gious groups in the workforce, including managerial, supervisory, adminis-
trative, clerical and technical jobs.
2) Adequate security for the protection of minority employees, both at the
workplace and while traveling to and from work.
3) The banning of provocative, sectarian, or political emblems from the
workplace.
4) All job openings to be publicly advertised; and special recruitment efforts to
be made to attract applicants from under-represented religious groups.
5) Layoff, recall, and termination procedures not to be practised in favour of
particular religious groupings.
6) The abolition of job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions, and differen-
tial employment criteria, which discriminate on the basis of religion or eth-
nic origin.
7) The development of training programmes that will prepare substantial num-
bers of minority employees for skilled jobs, including the expansion of ex-
isting programmes and the creation of new programmes to train, upgrade,
and improve the skills of all categories of minority employees.
8) The establishment of procedures to assess, identify, and actively recruit mi-
nority employees with potential for further advancement.
9) The appointment of a senior management staff member to oversee the com-
pany's affirmative action efforts and the setting up of timetables to carry out
affirmative action principles.
O'Callaghan, supra note 116, at 45.
129. Stivers, supra note 126, at 167.
130. Id. at 168.
131. Id. at 167.
132. Id.
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E. TNC SELF-REGULATION THROUGH CODES OF CONDUCT
A number of major U.S. companies that can be defined as
TNCs have voluntarily promulgated internal policies and proce-
dures for dealing with human rights abuses in host countries.' 33
Although the policies vary in degree and specificity, they repre-
sent a growing trend for the many visible TNCs to state their
commitment to respecting and protecting human rights. Inter-
nal standards are useful to companies, especially if made public,
because they offer proof of their concern about these issues.
Many of these policies reflect a belief that economic leverage
may be used to persuade foreign governments to abide by inter-
national human rights standards. These internal codes of con-
duct can be roughly divided into three types: vendor standards
regarding forced and child labor; standards in support of civil
and political rights; and criteria for investment.
1. Vendor Standards
Several companies have enacted minimum standards re-
garding conditions of employment for their workers and those of
their business partners. The common features of these stan-
dards include a prohibition on forced, convict, or child labor.
Companies with these standards for their overseas operations
include K-Mart, J.C. Penneys, Phillips-Van Heusen, Reebok In-
ternational Ltd., Sears, Roebuck & Co., Timberland, and Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. 134 In addition to these retailers, Starbucks
Coffee Company adopted a code of conduct in 1995 for workers
at the coffee plantations from which it buys its coffee beans,
thereby becoming the first U.S. company address the human
rights issues associated with sourcing practices for a major agri-
cultural commodity. 135
Wal-Mart's policies are typical of these codes of conduct, and
result from a 1993 NBC-TV expose of children working in a Ban-
gladesh factory under contract to make shirts for Wal-Mart. 136
133. Ferrari, supra note 49, at 5.
134. Id. Telephone Interview with Aron Kramer, Businesses for Social Re-
sponsibility, San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 16, 1996).
135. Telephone Interview with Aron Kramer, supra note 134. The
Starbucks code limits child labor and supports workers' access to safe housing
and healthy work places, supports progressive environmental practices, safe-
guards freedom of association, and supports a wage level that addresses the
basic needs of workers and their families. URGENT AcTION UPDATES (Christian
Task Force on Central America, B.C., Canada), Jan. 11, 1996, at 2.
136. See Human Rights: Ethical Shopping, supra note 16, at 58.
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The policy states, in pertinent part, that all foreign vendors
shall:
[Clomply with applicable U.S. import laws (including forced labor
products prohibition)... Vendors shall meet conditions of employment
that include appropriate compensation- for employees, maintain rea-
sonable hours, refrain from engaging in forced or prison labor prac-
tices, refrain from using child labor, [and] demonstrate a commitment
to basic human rights (allowing for cultural differences).1 3 7
Sears, Roebuck & Co. has a similar formal policy regarding
goods produced by forced labor.138 Sears announced this policy
in March of 1991 after several of its unions complained that the
buying practices of Sears did not adequately ensure that prod-
ucts produced by forced or convict labor were not purchased by
the company. 139
137. See Wal-Mart Standards, supra note 102, at 1-5.
138. The entire Sears policy is as follows:
1. Sears will provide to its buying office in Hong Kong a policy statement and
advisory regarding goods made by forced or convict labor. The statement
shall emphasize that it is against Sears policy and U.S. law to purchase such
goods for importation into the United States. The buying office shall also be
provided with a copy of the relevant U.S. laws and regulations pertaining to
the importation of goods made by forced labor.
2. Copies of Sears (sic) policy statement shall be provided to all manufacturers
and trading companies from which Sears purchases goods made in China.
3. Sears shall include in each contract it makes with a manufacturer in main-
land China or a trading company sourcing goods from a manufacturer in
mainland China a representation by the manufacturer or trading company
that none of the goods being provided have been made by convict or forced
labor. Sears will not do business with any supplier found to be violating this
provision and will report evidence relating to violations to the U.S. Custom
Service.
4. Sears will maintain a list of the names and addresses of all manufacturing
sites in mainland China whose products Sears purchases .... Sears shall
require of the trading companies with which it contracts for goods made in
mainland China that they provide Sears with a list of names of and ad-
dresses of the manufacturers whose goods Sears will be purchasing. Said
list shall be available for shareholder inspection upon written request.
5. Sears shall attempt to obtain a list of the addresses of sites of forced labor in
mainland China for the purposes of checking that list against the supplier
list referred to above.
6. Sears employees may from time to time conduct unannounced inspections of
manufacturing sites in mainland China to determine compliance with U.S.
law as regards the use of forced or convict labor.
Memorandum from Sears, Roebuck & Co. Announcing Policy on Goods Made by
Forced Labor in China (Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter Sears Memorandum] (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
139. New Sears Policy, MDNNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Apr. 1, 1992, at D5.
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2. Standards Supporting Civil and Political Rights -
Some companies go beyond labor issues to expressly commit
themselves to protecting political rights, including freedom of
association, freedom from compulsory political indoctrination,
and freedom from labor as a punishment for holding or for
peacefully expressing political views. Reebok International
Limited's policy is an example of this more expansive human
rights policy. Reebok's practice includes a commitment to with-
draw from countries violating political rights and active encour-
agement of those rights in countries where the company
operates. 140
3. Investment Criteria
A few companies have publicly stated bottom line principles
guiding decisions about whether or not to do business in a coun-
try with significant human rights problems. Most notable is the
Levi Strauss & Co. policy that commits the company not to do
business in countries with pervasive violations of basic human
rights. 141 In its "Global Sourcing Guidelines," Levi Strauss &
Co. explicitly declares its standards for country selection and
140. Reebok announced the following principles in November 1990 specifi-
cally in response to human rights abuses in China:
1. Reebok will not operate under martial law conditions or allow any military
. presence on its premises.
2. Reebok encourages free association and assembly among its employees.
3. Reebok will seek to ensure that opportunities for advancement are based on
initiative, leadership and contributions to the business, not political beliefs.
Further, no one is to be dismissed from working at its factories for political
views or non-violent involvement.
4. Reebok will seek to prevent compulsory political indoctrination programs
from taking place on its premises.
5. Reebok reaffirms that it deplores the use of force against human rights.
Reebok Code of Conduct, in Orentlicher and Gelatt, supra note 13, at 108 [here-
inafter Reebok Code of Conduct]. In 1992 Reebok adopted "Human Rights Pro-
duction Standards" governing its relations with suppliers and business
partners. Orentlicher and Gelatt, supra note 13, at 108 & app. at 127-28.
141. Memorandum from Levi Strauss & Co. Regarding Business Partner
Terms of Engagement and Guidelines for Country Selection (Jun. 28, 1993)
[hereinafter Levi Memorandum]. Levi Strauss's policy also has the following
labor standards for vendors:
Use of child labor is not permissible.... We will not knowingly utilize
prison or forced labor in contracting or subcontracting relationships in
the manufacture of products.... While recognizing and respecting cul-
tural differences, we believe that workers should be employed on the
basis of their ability to do the job, rather than on the basis of personal
characteristics or beliefs.... We will not utilize business partners who
use corporal punishment or other forms of mental or physical coercion.
Id. at 3.
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lists criteria the company believes "to be beyond the ability of
the individual business partner to control." 142 These criteria in-
clude adverse effects on global brand image, evidence that em-
ployees would be exposed to unreasonable risk, evidence of
pervasive violations of basic human rights, threat to trademarks
or other legal interests, and evidence of political or social tur-
moil that unreasonably threatens Levi's commercial
interests. 143
Levi Strauss's guidelines ostensibly led the company to an-
nounce in early 1992 that it was terminating business arrange-
ments with suppliers in Burma after discovering that the
Burmese Government, notorious for human rights abuses, held
substantial ownership stakes in major suppliers.144 In May
1993 Levi's announced that it would phase out its ties with most
contractors in China and would not make any direct invest-
ments in the country because of the Chinese Government's per-
vasive human rights violations. 145
Ill. CONTINUUM OF RESPONSIBILITY
An analysis of the inter-governmental, governmental, pri-
vately initiated and corporate codes of conduct described above
illustrates their various strengths and weaknesses. These codes
do give some limited guidance for TNCs that wish to comply
with minimum norms regarding human rights. Existing codes,
however, are grossly inadequate. In light of the human rights
violations occurring in countries where TNCs operate, a com-
pany's goodwill, business culture, and knowledge of best prac-
tices largely determine how it chooses to respond to human
rights violations affecting its employees or other stakeholders.
What can be gleaned from existing and proposed codes sug-
gests that TNC responsibility falls into a continuum of legal and
moral responsibility that can be divided into four broad levels.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Ferrari, supra note 49, at 5.
145. Id. For an interesting analysis of Levi's decision-making process con-
cerning China, see Beaver, supra note 17. Since the mid-1980s, under the lead-
ership of CEO Robert Haas, Levi Strauss has redefined its business strategy,
focusing on a value-centered management emphasizing socially responsible em-
ployee rights. Id. The company has severed relationships with 30 business
partners and demanded change from 120 others in various countries. Id. Crit-
ics accuse Levi's of leaving China as a marketing stunt, noting that the com-
pany has no direct investment in China and easily will be able to find other low-
cost sub-contractors in Asia. Id.
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At the primary level of responsibility, the TNC has the greatest
duty to act when the company itself is compelled to participate
in the human rights abuse. On the other end of the continuum
are situations imposing the least responsibility for action by the
company. Such situations include scenarios in which the com-
pany lacks involvement in the human rights violations as well
as influence over the perpetrator of the violations.
A. PRIMARY CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
Where a TNC is actively involved in violating the human
rights defined in the International Bill of Human Rights, the
TNC must take action to prevent or correct the violation. This
primary level of responsibility is illustrated in the following hy-
pothetical case, which represents a human rights issue facing
employers in many politically oppressive environments: freedom
of political expression.
CASE A. Employee X is a production supervisor in the plant of
TNC, a company doing business in a country with serious human
rights problems. X has become involved as a leader of a democracy
movement in opposition to the host government. X has been active at
the TNC's plant and outside of work, encouraging democratic reform.
X discusses his political views with a group of fellow employees during
lunch time on the plant premises. Government officials contact the
TNC's management and request that X be fired for expressing his
political opinions.
The government's efforts to punish X for his political activi-
ties clearly violates several fundamental human rights norms. If
TNC succumbs to government pressure to fire X, it too would be
violating international norms. Firing X for expressing his polit-
ical beliefs violates article 18 (Freedom of conscience), article 19
(freedom of expression), article 20 (freedom of association), and
article 21 (right to participate in government) of the UDHR.146
What, then, are the TNC's responsibilities to act? Under
the current draft of the U.N. Code of Conduct for TNCs, the com-
pany is required under paragraph 13 to respect human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and especially is prohibited from
basing employment decisions on political beliefs. 147 Under the
proposed U.N. Code of Conduct, the company would be required
146. Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
147. Development and International Economic Co-Operation: Transnational
Corporations, supra note 68, at 7. While the code was never adopted, it reflects
the most recent views of the U.N. on the activities of TNCs regarding human
rights.
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to protect the employee's rights and not to fire X.148 Under sec-
tion 401(b)(1) of the Miller Bill,1 49 requiring that employment
decisions not be made on the basis of political belief or activity,
the result would be the same. The Miller Bill goes further than
the U.N. Code of Conduct, providing that corporations ensure
their employees enjoy freedom of expression and association.150
Under the Clinton Administration's Model Business Princi-
ples, the TNC pledges to respect the right of association.' 51 The
Clinton Administration's principles also call for "a corporate cul-
ture that respects free expression consistent with legitimate
business concerns." 152 Presumably, the condition regarding le-
gitimate business concerns has to do with protection of intellec-
tual property and trade secrets, and is not intended as a curb on
political expression. Still, the Clinton Code does not go as far as
the Miller Bill in safeguarding the right to political speech for
employees.
The internal codes of those companies with vendor stan-
dards are generally silent regarding the employee's right to
political expression.' 53 Some companies, however, such as Levi
Strauss & Co. and Reebok International Limited, expressly for-
bid employment decisions based on political belief. Levi
Strauss's policy states that employment will be based on ability
and not belief.' 54 Reebok's policy directly states that employees
will not be terminated for peaceful political participation.' 55
It appears then, that there is general agreement under the
codes presented that a TNC should not fire an employee who
exercises his or her political beliefs. The duty of a TNC to re-
spect the human rights defined in the International Bill of
Human Rights also supports this agreement.'5 6 The important
distinction between the first level of responsibility, illustrated
here, and the other levels is that the company is the direct actor.
148. Id.
149. H.R. 3489, 102d Cong. § 401(b)(1) (1991). While the Miller Bill was
never enacted, it represents the most comprehensive legislative effort to regu-
late the overseas actions of U.S.-based TNCs.
150. Id. § 401(b)(5), (7).
151. See MODEL BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 24.
152. Id. art. 5.
153. See, e.g., Sears Memorandum, supra note 138. The Sears policy ad-
dresses only the use of forced labor. Id.
154. See Levi Memorandum, supra note 141.
155. See Reebok Code of Conduct, supra note 140, art. 3.
156. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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B. PASSIVE INVOLVEMENT, IN HumAN, RiGHTs VIOLATIONS
At the second level of responsibility the corporation pas-
sively allows human rights abuses in a situation where it has
some ability to prevent such abuses. Case B illustrates the
TNC's responsibility at this level.
CASE B. TNC is aware that the government has arrested employee
B for her role in organizing employees in TNC's plant to form a labor
union for purposes of collective bargaining. Employee B has been a
particular thorn in the side of TNC, which prefers that its plant not be
unionized. TNC therefore appears to benefit from the arrest of B, even
if though did not participate in the arrest in any way.
The arrest of B violates several international human norms,
especially basic workers rights, contained in the UDHR includ-
ing article 3 (security of person), article 8 (effective legal rem-
edy), article 9 (freedom from arbitrary arrest), article 19 (free
expression), article 20 (freedom of association), article 23(4)
(right to form and join trade unions).1 57 The International La-
bor Organization's (ILO) Convention No. 87, Concerning Free-
dom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, also
expressly guarantees the freedom to form and join labor
organizations. 158
Given the violation of these rights, what is the TNCs re-
sponsibility to act? The proposed U.N. Code of Conduct requires
corporate action in respect for human rights, but it is not explicit
about whether a company must act to prevent arrest for interna-
tionally lawful activities. The Miller Bill on the other hand
clearly states that U.S.-based TNCs must "undertake to protect
the freedom of assembly and association among employees." 15 9
The Miller bill language indicates that the TNC in Case B has
an affirmative responsibility to intervene with the government
on behalf of employee B.
Under the Clinton Administration's Model Business Princi-
ples, the TNC pledges to engage in fair employment practices
"including ... respect for the right of association and the right to
organize and bargain collectively."' 60 Like the Clinton Code, ex-
157. Universal Declaration, supra note 1.
158. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Con-
vention, supra note 110. The ILO is a tripartite organization involving govern-
ments, representatives of labor and representatives of business. As such, it
binds its members, including businesses, to respect a broad array of labor stan-
dards. Freedom of association, including the right to organize, is one of the
core principles in the laws promulgated by the ILO. See Orentlicher and Gelatt,
supra note 13, at 109-16.
159. H.R. 3489, 102d Cong. § 401(b)(5) (1991).
160. MODEL BusiNEss PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, art. 2.
MINN.. J GLOBAL TRADE
isting corporate codes are silent on their obligation or intention
to intervene with a host government on behalf of employees
whose rights are violated. The vendor codes focus solely on
forced, convict, and child labor and do not even discuss freedom
of association. Only the Reebok and Levi Strauss principles
state an affirmative policy to protect an employee's freedom of
as.ociation. 161
While many of these codes stop short of imposing an affirm-
ative responsibility on TNCs to intervene with host governments
on behalf of their employees, Case B offers a clear example of
where such a duty should apply. Here, as the agent of the TNC,
the government can be said to be carrying out a violation. This
practice occurs frequently in countries where the TNC has sig-
nificant economic leverage, and therefore the TNC has an af-
firmative duty under international law to respect the freedom of
association of its workers. Even without strict legal liability for
B's arrest, TNC may want to protect its public image and its
relationship with its workers by standing up for B's rights in
this case. The TNC should not only act as an advocate on behalf
of B, but it should also assure its employees that it will take
steps to protect their right to organize.
C. CORPORATION HAS EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE
Corporations must consider how to act at a third level of
responsibility, in which the TNC is not responsible in any way
for the human rights violation, but where it has the power to
intervene to protect an individual's right. While a corporation
has limited legal responsibility at this level, there are several
good reasons for using its influence to prevent further abuse.
CASE C. Bank teller C at TNC-Bank, is on the verge of losing her
job because of excessive absenteeism as the result of being beaten by
her husband. TNC-Bank is operating in a country that does not have
adequate laws to protect women from domestic violence. The host
country also has a serious unemployment problem; it would be quite
easy to replace C. Does TNC-Bank have any responsibility to inter-
vene to protect C's rights?
Violence against women, once categorized as a private
sphere violation, is now considered a human rights violation
contravening the following rights, among others, guaranteed in
the UDHR: article 2 (non-discrimination), article 3 (security of
the person), article 5 (freedom from torture); article 7 (equal pro-
161. Reebok Code of Conduct, supra note 140, art. 2; Levi Memorandum,
supra note 141, at 2.
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tection); article 8 (effective legal remedy for violations); article
13 (freedom of movement). 162 Based on existing or proposed
codes of conduct, the legal responsibility for a TNC not to fire C,
but to intervene to protect her right to be free from violence in
the home, is not particularly strong. 163 The proposed U.N. Code
of Conduct prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. That
code, however, also encourages corporations to "respect local cul-
ture."16 4 Several corporate codes of conduct also suggest a bal-
ancing act between non-discrimination in employment and
"cultural differences." 165 Since other bases of discrimination,
such as race, religion, and ethnicity, are anathema in the inter-
national community, this "allowance" for cultural differences
comes to play primarily in employment decisions affecting wo-
men. This loophole in the enforcement of non-discrimination by
corporations allows enormous discretion by TNCs in their ac-
tions regarding the role of women in the workplace.
While the Miller Bill and the Clinton Code do not use condi-
tional language regarding the prohibition on sex discrimination,
neither do they suggest an affirmative duty for companies to in-
tervene in situations that take place outside the workplace. The
most instructive lessons in this area may be learned from pri-
vately initiated codes, such as the Sullivan Principles and the
MacBride Principles. TNCs desiring to take progressive action
to improve the status of women in the workplace and in the com-
munities in which they must live should follow the lead of these
country-specific codes by instigating a system of equal employ-
ment practices, training programs, and advancement proce-
dures specifically targeted at women. In addition, like the
signatories to Sullivan Principles, TNCs could take steps to im-
prove the quality of employees' lives outside the work
environment.
Considering best practices in the case of C, the TNC could
give employee C social and health support, while considering
legal support to encourage state action in her case and to stimu-
162. Universal Declaration, supra note 1; see ELIZABETH BRUCH ET AL., MIN-
NESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, LIFrING THE LAST CURTAIN: A REPORT
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ROMANIA 16 (1995) (stating that the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights and other international treaties obligate governments
to provide an adequate remedy for the denial of women's fundamental rights to
security of the person and freedom from torture and cruel and inhuman
treatment).
163. See generally Development and International Economic Co-Operation:
Transnational Corporations, supra note 68.
164. Id. 13.
165. See, e.g., Levi Memorandum, supra note 141.
5
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late effective redress system-wide. Ultimately, it will pay off in
terms of worker loyalty and productivity for the TNC to initiate
education programs for employees regarding violence against
women.
D. PERVASIVE VIOLATIONS
A fourth scenario regarding corporate responsibility under
governmental and corporate codes of conduct occurs when a cor-
poration is aware that pervasive violations of human rights are
occurring in the country, unrelated to TNC's operations. In this
scenario, the TNC has the lowest level of responsibility under
existing codes.
CASE D. TNC-resorts is considering building a hotel on the beauti-
ful unadulterated coast of an island country that is seeking to promote
its tourism industry. The host government is known for brutal repres-
sion, including mass killings, of indigenous minority groups in the inte-
rior of the island.
TNC-resorts in this case is unlikely to find much guidance
regarding its human rights responsibilities from the existing
codes. If there is no relation between the government's action
and TNC-resort's purpose, then there is no apparent restriction
on TNC-resort's investment in the country, nor is there an af-
firmative responsibility for TNC-resort to act to protect the
rights of ethnic minorities in the country.
With the exception of a few rogue states, 166 U.S. policy does
not favor disinvestment by private companies in countries with
even the poorest human rights records. 167 In fact, in unveiling
its model business principles, the Clinton Administration under-
scored its assumption that "U.S. business can and does play a
positive and important role promoting the openness of societies,
respect for individual rights, the promotion of free markets and
prosperity, environmental protection and the setting of high
standards for business practices generally."6 8 The Executive
branch, therefore, would not regulate TNC-resort's decision to
invest in the island country, but would encourage the business
to act as a model, "encouraging similar behavior by their part-
ners, suppliers, and subcontractors." 69 Whether or not TNC-
resort will be able to positively influence the government's ac-
166. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
167. See Christopher Letter, supra note 91.
168. MODEL BUSINESS PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, at 2.
169. Id. at 1.
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tions is a factor for the company to consider in its investment
decision.
On the other hand, the Miller bill indicates that, in some
circumstances, such as doing business in China, Congress may
assign an affirmative duty to a TNC to advocate on behalf of op-
pressed individuals or groups. The bill does not go so far, how-
ever, as to prohibit TNCs from doing business in China. 170
The internal policy of Levi Strauss & Co. suggests some
guidelines for deciding whether to invest. Levi's criteria for get-
ting out of, or not getting into, a country with pervasive human
rights problems include a potential adverse effect on the com-
pany's image, unreasonable risk to employees, and evidence of
political and social turmoil that would unreasonably threaten
Levi's commercial interests. 171 Using similar criteria, and
prompted by vocal consumers, labor unions and shareholders,
several U.S. companies, including Levi Strauss itself, Liz Clai-
borne, Eddie Bauer Inc., and Macy's, have chosen not to do busi-
ness in Burma. 172
TNC-resort's decision whether to invest in the island coun-
try is ultimately a business decision. In a consumer-sensitive
industry like tourism, TNC-resort must consider what public re-
action it may face for building a hotel in a country with serious
human rights violations. The TNC in Case D must consider the
appearance that its investment would be "propping up" an un-
just regime. Besides the Levi's criteria, TNC-resort should
weigh the following ethical considerations: (1) the degree of seri-
ousness of the ongoing human rights violations; (2) the level of
interaction TNC-resort will have with the offending government;
(3) the ability of TNC-resort to have a positive influence on the
human rights situation; and (4) any potential or perceived con-
nection between the work of the company and the human rights
violations. These factors may have more of an impact on a
TNC's decision to invest or to intervene actively in human rights
violations in the host country than any code of conduct, espe-
cially when consumer pressure is brought to bear upon it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Human rights advocates are constantly looking for new
levers to exert pressure on governments to stop their human
170. H.R. 3489, 102d Cong. § 401(b)(9) (1991).
171. See Levi Memorandum, supra note 141, at 2.
172. G. Pascal Zachary, Macy's is Latest to Cut Ties with Burma, AsIAN
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1995, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA database.
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rights violations. The past fifty years have been characterized
by international and national efforts to define and enforce
human rights norms. This international diplomatic activity can
be supported and strengthened by appropriate policies, both
public and private, for corporate action to discourage human
rights abuses.
Public pressure and corporate concerns about operating in a
stable business environment have resulted in rudimentary poli-
cies regarding corporate responsibility in the face of human
rights abuses. These policies are bound to be refined as interna-
tional business decision-makers confront more and different sit-
uations of government violations of fundamental human rights.
A proactive approach by TNCs will result in a more coherent,
and more humane, response to human rights abuses in the coun-
tries in which they operate.
